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1 Introduction
If a firm (financial enterprise, bank, insurance company, investment fund, portfolio, etc.)
consists of divisions (individuals, products, subportfolios, risk factors, etc.), not only is it
important to measure properly the risk of the firm, but also to allocate the risk capital of
the firm to the divisions. From now on we refer to this problem as risk allocation problem
and use the terms firm and divisions while keeping all the possible applications in mind.
In terms of measuring risk, we would like to model Expected Shortfall (Acerbi and
Tasche, 2002), which is promoted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCoBS,
2014) as the future industry standard, replacing Value-at-Risk. In this setting, a measure of
risk assigns a real number to the future profit and loss random variable from the perspective
of present. In order to keep the paper as simple as possible and to reach readers who are not
familiar with the advanced mathematics of finance, we work with a finite probability space,
where the portfolios of divisions are represented by realization vectors. We emphasize that
assuming a finite probability space is not an infringement of generality, all of our results
hold when the portfolios are described by bounded random variables on a measure space.
A coherent measure of risk (Artzner et al, 1999) satisfies four natural properties (see
Definition 2.1). A prominent example is the k-Expected Shortfall (Acerbi and Tasche,
2002), which is the average of the worst 100k percent of the losses for 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. On the
other hand, Value-at-Risk is not a coherent measure of risk (Artzner et al, 1999).
When using a coherent measure of risk, the risk of the portfolio of the firm is at most
as much as the sum of the risks of the portfolios of the divisions. Thus there is usually a
diversification benefit, which should be allocated somehow. Risk (capital) allocation games
(Denault, 2001) are transferable utility (TU) cooperative games defined to model such
risk allocation. In a TU game using the values (the negative of the risk) of the coalitions
(subsets) of the players (divisions) a solution concept (a risk allocation rule) determines
how to share the value of the grand coalition (the firm). An allocation is in the core if the
total value of the grand coalition is allocated (Efficiency) in such a way that no coalition
of the players fairs better by acting alone. A totally balanced game has a non-empty core
in each of its subgames, where a subgame is obtained by considering only a subset of the
players.
Cso´ka et al (2009) showed that the class of risk allocation games (using coherent mea-
sures of risk) coincides with the class of totally balanced games. That is, on the one hand,
for any risk allocation game there is a core allocation, a stable way to allocate risk using
an allocation rule satisfying Core Compatibility (CC). On the other hand, any totally bal-
anced game can be given by a properly chosen risk allocation game. Cso´ka and Herings
(2014) defined risk allocation games when divisions have illiquid portfolios and show that
the class of risk allocation games with liquidity also coincides with the class of totally bal-
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anced games. Cso´ka et al (2009) also proved that the class of risk allocation games with no
aggregate uncertainty equals the class of exact games (Schmeidler, 1972), where for each
coalition there is a core allocation allocating the stand-alone value of the coalition.
In addition to CC, in this paper we consider two further fairness properties of risk
capital allocation rules: Equal Treatment Property (ETP) and Strong Monotonicity (SM).
The motivation comes from Young’s axiomatization (Young, 1985) of the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953), where he showed that on the class of all games the Shapley value is the
only solution concept satisfying Efficiency, ETP and SM. It is well-known that the Shapley
value does not satisfy CC in general, hence the properties of CC, ETP and SM cannot be
satisfied simultaneously on the class of all games.
However, the validity of an axiomatization of a solution can vary from subclass to
subclass, e.g. Shapley’s axiomatization of the Shapley value (see Section 4) is valid on
the class of monotone games but not valid on the class of strictly monotone games. In
the case of risk allocation games (in particular totally balanced games or exact games) we
generalize Young’s result, and show that his axiomatization remains valid on the classes of
totally balanced and exact games. We will prove (Theorem 3.4) that on the class of risk
allocation games there is no risk allocation rule satisfying CC, ETP and SM at the same
time.
We also interpret the requirements in the risk allocation setting as follows. CC is
satisfied if all the risk of the firm is allocated in such a way that no group of the divisions
can improve by allocating only the risk of the group, the risk allocation can rightly be seen
stable. The blocking interpretations of the core can be questioned by saying that divisions
cannot really leave the firm, see also Homburg and Scherpereel (2008). However, CC can
also be viewed in an other way. The allocated risk to each coalition should be at least as
much as the risk increment the coalition causes by joining the complementary coalition.
ETP ensures that if two divisions have the same stand-alone risk and also they contribute
the same risk to all the subsets of divisions not containing them, then they are treated
equally, that is, the same risk capital is allocated to them. In other words, ETP states that
if two divisions are not distinguishable from the point of view of risk, then they must be
evaluated equally. SM requires that if a division weakly reduces its stand-alone risk and
also its risk contribution to all the subsets of the other divisions (hence weakly increases
its relative performance), then its allocated capital should not increase. Therefore, SM is
closely related to Incentive Compatibility.
We will also prove (Proposition 3.5) that on the class of totally balanced (exact) games
if a risk allocation rule meets CC and SM together, then there does exist a risk allocation
rule which satisfies CC, SM and ETP together. However, we know from Theorem 3.4
that these three properties cannot hold at the same time, hence we find two (independent)
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requirements to blame for the impossibility result: CC and SM, one has to give up at least
one of them.
Finally, in Example 3.8 we will illustrate that our impossibility result (Theorem 3.7)
can be made stronger, because in all practical applications SM can be replaced by the
following requirement: if a division’s stand-alone performance increases, then its allocated
risk should not increase. That is, in practice there does not exist a risk allocation rule
which satisfies CC and Incentive Compatibility at the same time.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we introduce the notations
and notions for transferable utility cooperative games in general and risk allocations games
in particular. In Section 3 we present our impossibility result. In Section 4 we show how our
impossibility result is related to other results in the literature. The last section concludes.
2 Risk allocation games
We will use the following notations and notions: |N | is for the cardinality of a finite set N
and 2N is the power set of N .
Let N denote the finite set of players. A cooperative game with transferable utility
(game, for short) is a function v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0. The class of games with
player set N is denoted by GN . For a game v ∈ GN and a coalition C ∈ 2N , a subgame vC
is obtained by restricting v to the subsets of C.
An allocation is a vector x ∈ RN , where xi is the payoff of player i ∈ N . An allocation
x yields payoff x(C) =
∑
i∈C xi to a coalition C ∈ 2N . An allocation x ∈ RN is called
Efficient, if x(N) = v(N) and Coalitionally Rational if x(C) ≥ v(C) for all C ∈ 2N . The
core (Gillies, 1959) is the set of Efficient and Coalitionally Rational allocations. The core
of game v is denoted by core (v).
Let v ∈ GN and i ∈ N be a game and a player, and for all C ⊆ N let v′i(C) =
v(C ∪ {i})− v(C) denote player i’s marginal contribution to coalition C in game v. Then
v′i is called player i’s marginal contribution function in game v. Moreover, players i and
j are equivalent in game v, i ∼v j, if for every C ⊆ N such that i, j /∈ C we have that
v′i(C) = v
′
j(C).
A game is totally balanced, if each of its subgame has a non-empty core. Let GNtb denote
the class of totally balanced games with player set N .
An interesting subclass of totally balanced games is the class of exact games (Schmei-
dler, 1972). A game v is exact, if for each coalition C there exists an allocation x ∈ core (v)
such that x(C) = v(C). Let GNe denote the class of exact games with player set N .
Throughout the paper we consider single-valued solutions. The function ψ : A → RN ,
defined on A ⊆ GN , is called solution on the class of games A. In the context of risk
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allocation, we refer to solutions as risk allocation rules.
For any game v ∈ GN the Shapley solution φ is given by
φi(v) =
∑
C⊆N\{i}
v′i(C)
|C|!(|N \ C| − 1)!
|N |! i ∈ N,
where φi(v) is also called the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of player i in game v.
To define risk allocation games we use the setup of Cso´ka et al (2009). Let S denote
the finite number of states of nature and consider the set RS of realization vectors. State of
nature s occurs with probability ps > 0, where
∑S
s=1 ps = 1. The vector X ∈ RS represents
a division’s possible profit and loss realizations. The amount Xs is the division’s payoff in
state of nature s. Negative values of Xs correspond to losses.
A measure of risk is a function ρ : RS → R measuring the risk of a realization vector.
Definition 2.1. A function ρ : RS → R is called a coherent measure of risk (Artzner et al,
1999) if it satisfies the following axioms:
1. Monotonicity : for all X, Y ∈ RS such that Y ≥ X, we have ρ(Y ) ≤ ρ(X).
2. Subadditivity : for all X, Y ∈ RS, we have ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
3. Positive homogeneity : for all X ∈ RS and h ∈ R+, we have ρ(hX) = hρ(X).
4. Translation invariance: for all X ∈ RS and a ∈ R, we have ρ(X + a1S) = ρ(X)− a.
For an interpretation of the axioms see Acerbi and Scandolo (2008), who justify them
for incorporating liquidity risk as well. A prominent example for a coherent measure of risk
is the k-Expected Shortfall (Acerbi and Tasche, 2002), which is the average of the worst
100k percent of the losses for 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. Note that for k = 0 we get the maximal loss,
which is then also a coherent measure of risk.
Let the matrix of realization vectors corresponding to the divisions be given by X ∈
RS×N , and let X·i denote column i of X, the realization vector of division i. For a coalition
of divisions C ∈ 2N , let XC =
∑
i∈C X·i.
A risk environment is a tuple (N,S, p,X, ρ), where N is the set of divisions, S indicates
the number of states of nature, p = (p1, . . . , pS) is the vector of realization probabilities of
the various states, X is the matrix of realization vectors, and ρ is a coherent measure of
risk.
A risk allocation game assigns to each coalition of divisions the negative of the risk the
coalition runs in its aggregate portfolio.
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Definition 2.2. Given the risk environment (N,S, p,X, ρ), a risk allocation game is a
game v ∈ GN , where
v(C) = −ρ(XC) for all C ∈ 2N \ {∅} , (1)
and v(∅) = 0.
Let GNr denote the family of risk allocation games with player set N . In such games,
according to Equation (1), the larger the risk of any subset of divisions, the lower its value.
We illustrate the definition of the risk allocation game by the following example.
Example 2.3. Consider the following risk environment (N,S, p,X, ρ). We have 3 divisions,
7 states of nature with equal probability of occurrence. Risk is calculated by using the
matrix of realization vectors in the first three columns of Table 1 and the maximum loss
risk measure.
S\XC X{1} X{2} X{3} X{1,2} X{1,3} X{2,3} X{1,2,3}
1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 1 0 1 1 2 1 2
3 1 1 0 2 1 1 2
4 1/2 1/2 1 1 3/2 3/2 2
5 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
6 1 1/2 1/2 3/2 3/2 1 2
7 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
ρ(C) 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1
v(C) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Table 1: The matrix of realization vectors of a risk environment and the resulting totally
balanced risk allocation game v using the maximum loss as a measure of risk.
Note that for all C ∈ 2N \ {∅} the value function is given by v(C) = −ρ(XC) =
mins∈S XC,s.
If the rows of a matrix of realization vectors sum up to the same number, then there
is no aggregate uncertainty. Formally: a matrix of realization vectors X ∈ RS×N has no
aggregate uncertainty, if there exists a number α ∈ R such that XN = α1S. Let GNrnau
denote the family of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty and with player
set N .
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Theorem 2.4. (Cso´ka et al, 2009; Cso´ka and Herings, 2014) The class of risk allocation
games with or without liquidity coincides with the class of totally balanced games, that is,
GNr = GNtb. Moreover, the class of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty equals
the class of exact games, that is, GNrnau = GNe .
Note that by Theorem 2.4 all risk allocation games with or without liquidity are totally
balanced (also the one in Example 2.3), and if there is no aggregate uncertainty, then all of
them are exact. Moreover, for any totally balanced (exact) game there is a risk environment
including a coherent measure of risk (with no aggregate uncertainty) that generates the
game using Equation (1).
A risk allocation rule shows how to share the risk of the firm among the divisions. Since
the situation can be converted into a TU game, a risk allocation rule can also be a solution
in cooperative game theory, such as e.g. the Shapley solution. We illustrate the marginal
contribution function and the fact that the Shapley solution is not always in the core by
continuing Example 2.3.
Example 2.5. Consider the risk allocation game in Example 2.3.
C ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
v(C) 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
v′1(C) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
v′2(C) 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
v′3(C) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table 2: The marginal contribution functions of players 1, 2 and 3.
Note that player 2 has a higher marginal contribution than the others, which is also
expressed by the Shapley value, since φ(v) = (1/6, 2/3, 1/6). However, coalition {1, 2} is a
blocking coalition for the Shapley solution in game v, since v({1, 2}) = 1 > 5/6 = 1/6+2/3,
that is, φ(v) /∈ core (v).
3 The impossibility result
Next, we introduce the four basic properties (axioms) that we focus on.
Definition 3.1. The solution ψ on subclass A ⊆ GN satisfies
• Core Compatibility (CC) if for each v ∈ A, we have ψ(v) ∈ core (v),
• Efficiency if for each v ∈ A, we have ∑
i∈N
ψi(v) = v(N),
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• Equal Treatment Property (ETP) if for all v ∈ A and i, j ∈ N such that i ∼v j, we
have ψi(v) = ψj(v),
• Strong Monotonicity (SM) if for all v, w ∈ A and i ∈ N such that v′i ≤ w′i, we have
ψi(v) ≤ ψi(w).
The financial interpretations of the requirements are as follows. CC is satisfied if the
risk allocation rule results in a core allocation, that is, all the risk of the firm is allocated
in such a way that no group of the divisions can fair better by allocating only the risk of
the group. A core compatible risk allocation can rightly be viewed stable. Notice that for
a Coalitionally Rational allocation x we have that x(N \ C) ≥ v(N \ C) for all C ∈ 2N ,
which, together with Efficiency imply that x(C) ≤ v(N)− v(N \ C) for all C ∈ 2N . That
is, in a core allocation the value (“diversification gain”) allocated to each coalition can be
at most as much as its contribution to the complementary coalition. To put it differently,
the allocated risk to each coalition should be at least as much as the risk increment the
coalition causes by joining the complementary coalition.
Efficiency is implied by CC, since it requires that all the risk of the firm should be
allocated to the divisions.
ETP makes sure that if two divisions have the same stand-alone risk and also they
contribute the same risk to all the subsets of divisions not containing them, then they are
treated equally, that is, the same risk capital is allocated to them. In other words, if two
divisions are the same from the viewpoint of risk, then by ETP the same risk is assigned
to both.
SM requires that if a division weakly reduces its stand-alone risk and also its risk
contribution to all the subsets of the other divisions, hence weakly increases its relative
performance, then its allocated capital should not increase. Thus as a kind of Incentive
Compatibility notion, weakly better relative performance is weakly rewarded. Note that
it follows from SM that for any v, w ∈ A, i ∈ N such that v′i = w′i, we have ψi(v) = ψi(w)
(called Marginality).
Theorem 3.2. (Theorem 2, Young (1985)). Let ψ be a solution on the class of all games.
Then solution ψ satisfies Efficiency, ETP and SM (Marginality) if and only if ψ = φ, that
is, if and only if it is the Shapley solution.
Note that risk allocation games form a proper subset of all games, since they are always
totally balanced. In the following, we prove a Theorem 3.2 type result on the classes of
totally balanced and exact games.
Theorem 3.3. Let ψ be a solution on the class of totally balanced (exact) games. Then
solution ψ satisfies Efficiency, ETP and SM (Marginality) if and only if ψ = φ, that is, if
and only if it is the Shapley solution.
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Proof. If: See e.g. Young (1985).
Only if: Let uT denote the unanimity game on coalition T , that is, for all C ⊆ N :
uT (C) =
{
1, if C ⊇ T
0 otherwise
.
Next, we generalize Theorem 3.2 for such classes of games where if a game v is in the
class, then for all α > 0 and coalition T we have that v + αuT is also in the class. Notice
that the class of totally balanced (exact) games is such class of games, since we get the
required core allocations by distributing α among the members of coalition T in a proper
way.
Let v be a totally balanced (exact) game and let us decompose it to the unique sum
of unanimity games such as v =
∑
T⊆N αTuT . Moreover, let α
m = maxT⊆N αT , v∗ =
αm
∑
T⊆N uT , and vd = v
∗ − v.
Notice that v∗ is a totally balanced (exact) game and in vd =
∑
T⊆N βTuT we have that
βT ≥ 0 for all T ⊆ N . For each game w define the index I(w) as follows: I(w) = |{γT 6=
0 : w =
∑
T⊆N γTuT}|.
The proof goes by induction on I(vd).
If I(vd) = 0, then v = v
∗, all players are equivalent in game v, so Efficiency and ETP
imply that solution ψ is well-defined (unique) for game v.
Let k be an integer such that 0 < k < 2|N | − 1. Assume that for each totally balanced
(exact) game w such that I(wd) ≤ k, ψ(w) is well-defined. Then, let v be a totally balanced
(exact) game such that I(vd) = k+ 1. Consider the decomposition vd =
∑
T⊆N βTuT , that
is, v = v∗ −∑T⊆N βTuT , where βT ≥ 0 for all T ⊆ N .
First, if it exists, take any player i for which there exists T ⊆ N , βT > 0 such that
i /∈ T . Let vk = v + βTuT . Notice that since βT > 0 we have that vk is totally balanced
(exact). Moreover, I(vkd) = k and by the induction hypothesis ψ(v
k) is well-defined. Since
v′i = (v + βTuT )
′
i, SM (Marginality) implies that ψi(v) = ψi(v
k).
Second, if they exist, take the remaining players, that is, take all i such that i ∈ T ⊆ N
for all T ⊆ N where βT > 0. These players are equivalent in v (since they are equivalent
in all games βTuT , βT > 0), so by ETP they get the same value.
Finally, by Efficiency, solution ψ is well-defined for game v.
Since the Shapley solution satisfies Efficiency, ETP and SM (Marginality) and ψ is
well-defined (unique) using these properties, we have ψ = φ. 2
Using Theorem 3.3 we can state the following.
Theorem 3.4. There is no risk allocation rule meeting the properties of CC, ETP and
SM (Marginality) at the same time.
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Proof. Theorem 3.3 is characterizing the Shapley value as being the only risk allocation
rule satisfying Efficiency, ETP and SM (Marginality) on the class of risk allocation games
with or without liquidity (with no aggregate uncertainty), which, by Theorem 2.4 coin-
cides with the class of totally balanced (exact) games. By Example 2.5 the Shapley value
is not always in the core for totally balanced games. Moreover, Rabie (1981) showed by an
example that for at least five players the Shapley value is not in the core for exact games. 2
So far we have established that the Shapley value is the only risk allocation rule sat-
isfying Efficiency, ETP and SM (Marginality) on the class of risk allocation games with
or without liquidity (with or without aggregate uncertainty), but it does not satisfy CC
in general, hence there is no hope to satisfy CC, ETP and SM (Marginality) at the same
time. Next, we show that Theorem 3.4 can be refined using the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that ψ is a solution satisfying CC and SM on the class of totally
balanced (exact) games. Then there exists a solution ψ¯ on the class of totally balanced
(exact) games which satisfies CC, SM and also meets ETP.
Proof. For all v ∈ GNtb (v ∈ GNe ) and player i ∈ N let
ψ¯(v)i =
1
|Π(N)|
∑
pi∈Π(N)
ψ(v ◦ pi)pi(i) ,
where Π(N) is the class of permutations on set N .
Then it is easy to see that for each pi ∈ Π(N) game v ◦ pi is a totally balanced (exact)
game, and v′i ≥ w′i if and only if (v ◦ pi)′pi(i) ≥ (w ◦ pi)′pi(i). Therefore ψ¯ also meets CC and
SM.
Take a game v ∈ GNtb (v ∈ GNe ) such that players i and j are equivalent in game
v. Let piij ∈ Π(N) be the permutation such that piij(k) = k if k ∈ N \ {i, j} and
piij(i) = j. Then for each permutation pi ∈ Π(N) we have that v ◦ pi ◦ piij = v ◦ pi.
Therefore
∑
pi∈Π(N) ψ(v ◦ pi)pi(i) =
∑
pi∈Π(N) ψ(v ◦ pi)pi(j). 2
Thus ETP is not independent from CC and SM on the class of totally balanced (exact)
games.
Remark 3.6. Notice that Proposition 3.5 can be (straightforwardly) generalized to the
case where CC is replaced by Efficiency, or SM is replaced either by Marginality or by
Coalitional Monotonicity (see Young (1985)). Moreover, the domain of axiomatization can
be any class of games which is closed under permutations. The relationship among the
above mentioned concepts of monotonicity and CC was also examined by Young (1985)
and Housman and Clark (1998).
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Using Proposition 3.5 we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7. There is no risk allocation rule satisfying the requirements of CC and SM
(Marginality) at the same time.
Proof. Assume that there is a risk allocation rule meeting the requirements of CC and
SM (Marginality) at the same time. Then by Proposition 3.5 there exists a solution ψ¯ on
the class of totally balanced (exact) games which satisfies CC, SM and also satisfies ETP,
contradicting Theorem 3.4. 2
The following example demonstrates that in practice SM can be replaced by the fol-
lowing requirement: if a divisions’ stand-alone (reported) performance increases, then its
allocated risk should not increase. That is, in practice SM can be replaced by Incentive
Compatibility.
Example 3.8. Consider the risk environments (N,S, p,X, ρ) and (N,S, p, Y, ρ), where
S = {s1, . . . , s19}, N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, p is the uniform distribution, ρ is the maximal
loss risk measure, and X is as in Table 3, Y is the same as X except for division 2,
where at state s19 it performs worse or reports worse performance by 3, that is, Y{2} =
X{2} − (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3)>.
Let the risk allocation games w and v be generated by risk environments (N,S, p,X, ρ)
and (N,S, p, Y, ρ), respectively. It is easy to see that we get the games by Young (1985)
(Theorem 1, pp. 69), where core(w) = (3, 0, 0, 6, 3) and core(v) = (0, 1, 2, 7, 1). Moreover,
Y{2} < X{2}, thus in this case division 2 can outsmart any risk allocation method satisfying
CC by performing worse or reporting less profit (like in Y ), because then it gets 1 instead of
0. In other words there is no risk allocation rule satisfying CC and Incentive Compatibility.
4 Relations to other axiomatic approaches
Other axiomatic approaches in the literature related to our work will be discussed below.
4.1 Denault (2001)
Denault (2001) considers (a version of) Shapley’s axiomatization of the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953), and concludes that there is no relevant risk allocation rule which satisfies
CC, Symmetry, Dummy Player Property and Additivity.
By Symmetry Denault (2001) means ETP, which is a bit misleading, since Symmetry
means something different: A solution ψ meets Symmetry if every game v ∈ GN and
permutation pi on N such that v = v◦pi, we have that for each player i ∈ N , ψi(v) = ψpi(i)(v)
(see Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007)).
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X{1} X{2} X{3} X{4} X{5}
s1 0 100 0 100 100
s2 100 100 3/2 100 3/2
s3 1 1 1 100 100
s4 0 0 100 0 100
s5 0 0 100 100 0
s6 3 100 3 3 100
s7 0 100 3/2 100 3/2
s8 0 100 100 0 0
s9 100 0 0 0 100
s10 100 0 3/2 100 3/2
s11 100 3 100 3 3
s12 100 100 3/2 0 3/2
s13 3 0 3 3 100
s14 0 0 3 100 0
s15 2 5 100 3 2
s16 3 100 3 3 0
s17 100 3 0 3 3
s18 3 0 0 6 3
s19 0 4 2 7 1
Table 3: The matrix X in Example 3.8
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It is worth noticing that the axioms ETP and Symmetry are not related to each other
in general, but for totally balanced games Symmetry is stronger than ETP.
Furthermore, a solution ψ satisfies the Dummy Player Property if every game v ∈ GN
and player i ∈ N such that v′i(S) = ci for all S ⊆ N \{i}, we have ψi(v) = ci. This axiom is
stronger than the related Shapley’s axiom (see Axiom 2 and Lemma 1 in Shapley (1953)).
A solution ψ meets Additivity if for all games v, w ∈ GN we have ψ(v+w) = ψ(v)+ψ(w).
Considering risk allocation games it is very difficult to interpret this axiom (there is a
similar problem in regression games, for more details see Pinte´r (2011)). The problem is
that while it is reasonable to add up the matrices of realization vectors of two risk allocation
games, the risk allocation game generated by the sum of two risk environments is typically
not the sum of the two risk allocation games generated by the two risk environments.
Actually, Additivity (on environments) only has a bite if the portfolios for each coalition
in the games to be added are comonotonic, that is, they are a positive function of the same
random variable. Therefore, in our opinion Shapley’s axiomatization of the Shapley value
does not fit with the risk allocation problem.
Moreover, Denault (2001) does not prove that Shapley’s axiomatization is true on the
class of risk allocation games. This is a problem because even if an axiomatization holds
on the whole class of games it does not mean that the axiomatization holds on a subclass
of games. E.g. Shapley’s axiomatization does not hold on the class of strictly monotone
games, where e.g. the egalitarian solution, where the value of the grand coalition is divided
equally among the players, also satisfies Shapley’s axioms. To the best of our knowledge
the problem of whether Shapley’s axioms characterize the Shapley value on the class of
risk allocation games is open.
What is also problematic is that Denault (2001) is imposing very strict necessary con-
ditions for the Shapley value to be in the core, which are not sufficient. In fact, we are not
aware of any necessary and sufficient conditions for the Shapley value to be in the core.
To sum up, Denault’s conclusion on a proper risk allocation method is only partially
verified, so it is worth to examine the problem further.
4.2 Other related papers
Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) also consider Shapley’s axiomatization of the Shapley value
for systemic risk allocation games but it has the same shortcomings as Denault (2001) (the
axiomatization is not proved and additivity is not so natural to require) and they even
interpret Additivity as Efficiency.
Valdez and Chernih (2003) showed that for elliptically contoured distributions the co-
variance (or beta) method satisfies CC (No Undercut), ETP (the authors call it Symmetry)
and Consistency (requiring that the allocation method should be independent of the hier-
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archical structure of the firm). However, Kim and Hardy (2009) showed that it is not even
true that the covariance method satisfies Core Compatibility in this setting. Moreover,
profit and loss distributions of financial assets are not elliptically contoured, but heavy
tailed (see for instance Cont (2001)), hence our approach is clearly more relevant by not
restricting the probability distributions.
Kalkbrener (2005) showed that Linear Aggregation, Diversification and Continuity char-
acterizes the gradient principle (or Euler method, where risk is allocated as a result of
slightly increasing the weights of the divisions) to be the only allocation which satisfies
these requirements. Although those requirements are also natural, they are not related to
the properties of CC, ETP or SM. In fact Kalkbrener (2005) explicitly assumed that the
risk allocated to a division does not depend on the decomposition of the other divisions,
only on the firm itself, which is a strange and strong assumption.
Finally, there is a related impossibility result by Buch and Dorfleitner (2008). They
showed that if one uses the gradient principle to allocate risk and ETP (the authors call
it Symmetry) is satisfied, then the measure of risk must be linear, not allowing for any
diversification benefits. In other words, Buch and Dorfleitner (2008) argue that ETP is to
blame for the impossibility of fair risk allocation. In this paper, however, we are looking for
a general risk allocation method, not the gradient one. Moreover, as our result (Theorem
3.7) indicates, in our setting it becomes clear that ETP cannot be blamed, but the fact
that CC and SM exclude each other makes the impossibility result to hold.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that by using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to allocate risk
satisfying simultaneously the natural requirements of Core Compatibility and Strong Mono-
tonicity (in practice Incentive Compatibility). To obtain the result we have characterized
the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games
as being the only risk allocation method satisfying Strong Monotonicity, Equal Treatment
Property and Efficiency. Both classes are proper subsets of all TU games, hence it is not
obvious that the characterization by Young (1985) holds on them. We have also interpreted
the axioms and our results in the risk allocation setting and clarified their relation to the
existing literature.
Since due to the results in this paper the Shapley value is the only risk allocation method
satisfying Strong Monotonicity, Equal Treatment Property and Efficiency, the deepness of
our impossibility result can be captured by checking the necessary and sufficient condition
for the Shapley value to be in the core. Since no such condition is known, one has to resort
to simulation. Balog et al (2014) showed that our analytical result is not only a theoretical
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possibility. For randomly generated risk allocation games with 3 or 4 divisions the Shapley
value is not in the core about 40-60% of the cases on the average. Cso´ka (2015) reported
only a few percent lower numbers for risk allocation games with liquidity. Moreover, for a
higher number of divisions in general we expect higher numbers.
Therefore our result raises the practical problem: one has to give up one of Core
Compatibility or Incentive Compatibility to allocate risk in practice too. Depending on the
application at hand, the literature on cooperative games can help in deciding requirement
to drop in light of the trade-off between theoretical versus computational gains and losses.
For instance (as we have seen) the Shapley solution meets Efficiency, Equal Treatment
Property and Strong Monotonicity (in practice Incentive Compatibility). Moreover, it is
well-known that the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) meets Core Compatibility and Equal
Treatment Property, and there are many other well-analyzed solution concepts to choose
from.
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